エビナ　タケシ   EBINA TAKESHI   海老名　剛    所属   明治大学  商学部    職種   専任教授
言語種別	英語
発行・発表の年月	2012/06
形態種別	学術雑誌
査読	査読あり
標題	"How to License a Public Licensor's Technology to an Asymmetric Duopoly", Economics and Business Letters
執筆形態	共著(筆頭者)
掲載誌名	Economics and Business Letters
掲載区分	国外
出版社・発行元	REUNDO
巻・号・頁	1(2),pp.16-26
著者・共著者	Takeshi Ebina and Shin Kishimoto
概要	We consider the issue of optimal licensing from the viewpoint of an external public licensor maximizing social welfare. Our principal findings are as follows. Fee licensing is always at least as good as royalty licensing for the public licensor. For small innovations, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which the public licensor licenses his patented technology to only an efficient (low-cost) firm maximizing its profit.
researchmap用URL	https://researchmap.jp/ebinatakeshi2010/