INOUE Tomoki    Department   Undergraduate School  , School of Political Science and Economics    Position   Senior Assistant Professor
Language	English
Publication Date	2020/02
Type	Academic Journal
Peer Review	Peer reviewed
Title	The nonemptiness of the inner core
Contribution Type	Sole-authored
Journal	Advances in Mathematical Economics
Publisher	Springer
Volume, Issue, Page	23,pp.85-107
Total page number	23
Details	We prove that if a non-transferable utility (NTU) game is cardinally balanced and if, at every individually rational and efficient payoff vector, every non-zero normal vector to the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is strictly positive, then the inner core is nonempty. The condition on normal vectors is satisfied if the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is non-leveled. An NTU game generated by an exchange economy where every consumer has a continuous, concave, and strongly monotone utility function satisfies our sufficient condition. Our proof relies on Qin's theorem on the nonemptiness of the inner core.
DOI	10.1007/978-981-15-0713-7_3