SAKUYAMA Takumi    Department   Undergraduate School  , School of Agriculture    Position   Professor
Date	2017/11/18
Presentation Theme	Electoral rules and protectionist motives:The case of Japan's participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
Conference	21st Annual Conference of the Japan Public Choice Society
Promoters	Japan Public Choice Society
Conference Type	Domestic
Presentation Type	Speech (General)
Contribution Type	Individual
Venue	Kwansei Gakuin University
Details	This article aims to contribute to the emerging literature on the linkage between electoral rules and politicians' preferences for protectionism. Specifically, the two hypotheses on the positive impacts of the proportional representation formula and the broadness of constituency size on candidates' support for freer trade are tested through the estimation of econometric models using candidates' response to pre-election surveys on Japan's participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement for the lower house election in 2012 and the upper house elections in 2013 and 2016. By extending the coverage to the upper house elections in 2013 and 2016, this article adds value to the previous literature. First, although the proportional representation formula has indeed positive impacts on the candidates' attitudes toward the TPP in the lower house election in 2012, this does not necessarily mean that constituency size is the source for this difference. Second, the share of agricultural and manufacturing workers in each constituency affects candidates' preferences for the TPP in the lower house election but not in the upper house elections. Third, candidates' political ideology plays an important role in determining their attitudes toward the TPP across houses and elections.