モリモト　ケイイチ   MORIMOTO KEIICHI   盛本　圭一    所属   明治大学  政治経済学部    職種   専任教授
言語種別	英語
発行・発表の年月	2025/03
形態種別	その他
標題	Policymakers' term limits and corporate income tax competition in a growing economy with heterogeneous agents
執筆形態	共著(筆頭者以外)
掲載誌名	Social Science Research Network eLibrary
掲載区分	国外
巻・号・頁	abstract_id=5175619
担当区分	最終著者,責任著者
著者・共著者	Noritaka MAEBAYASHI, Keiichi MORIMOTO
概要	We examine welfare losses from corporate income tax competition using a two-country R&D-based growth model with international knowledge spillover that incorporates myopic households and policymakers' limited terms of office. Policymakers who consider myopic household welfare, due to their finite planning horizon, choose a higher corporate income tax rate through the tax competition to increase short-term wages rather than long-term growth. When the policymakers' planning horizon is about the length of time that real politicians serve, this effect is quantitatively large, and the corporate income tax rate in the Nash equilibrium is well above the social optimum. The welfare losses, measured in terms of the household consumption lost due to tax competition, reach several percent in typical cases, an order of magnitude larger than in the previous study, which reports smaller values of 0.11% to 0.28% for the corresponding parameter set.