ササキ　ヒロキ   SASAKI HIROKI   佐々木　宏樹    所属   明治大学  農学部    職種   専任准教授
言語種別	英語
発行・発表の年月	2012/06
形態種別	学術雑誌
査読	査読あり
標題	Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments
執筆形態	共著(筆頭者以外)
掲載誌名	ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS
掲載区分	国外
出版社・発行元	SPRINGER
巻・号・頁	52(2),pp.157-179
著者・共著者	Kentaro Kawasaki,Takeshi Fujie,Kentaro Koito,Norikazu Inoue,Hiroki Sasaki
概要	Many agri-environmental conservation programs are faced with the problem of imperfect monitoring. This provides farmers with an incentive for noncompliance, because they can receive subsidies without implementing the conservation scheme. In this paper, bidding behavior and auction performance are compared for discriminatory-price and uniform-price auctions in an imperfect monitoring environment. Our theoretical analysis suggests that auction performances are equalized between the discriminatory-price and uniform-price auctions. However, laboratory experiments reveal that, although the discriminatory-price auction has an advantage in terms of reducing policy costs, it is more likely to cause adverse selection. As a result, the uniform-price auction tends to have higher efficiency and cost-effectiveness when compliance behavior is taken into account.
DOI	10.1007/s10640-012-9551-9
ISSN	0924-6460/1573-1502