カトウ　ゲント   KATO GENTO   加藤　言人    所属   明治大学  政治経済学部    職種   専任講師
言語種別	英語
発行・発表の年月	2020/07
形態種別	学術雑誌
査読	査読あり
標題	"When Strategic Uninformed Abstention Improves Democratic Accountability"
執筆形態	単著
掲載誌名	Journal of Theoretical Politics
掲載区分	国外
出版社・発行元	SAGE Publications
巻・号・頁	32(3),pp.366-388
担当区分	筆頭著者,責任著者
著者・共著者	◎Gento Kato
概要	... formal studies of elections produced two sets of findings that question the custom to treat voter information as a prerequisite for competent democratic decision-making. One argues that uninformed abstention is an effective strategy to approximate informed electoral outcome, and another suggests that uninformed voters may motivate strategic political elites to improve accountability. This article bridges and extends these two findings ... The proposed model offers a contextual explanation for two contrasting logic in uninformed abstention, delegation and discouragement, and shows that uninformed voting with abstention sometimes improves accountability. Furthermore, uninformed abstention is more effective in generating democratically preferred outcome under delegatory than discouraged context. The results make a significant addition to the existing accountability literature by providing a more general mechanism by which less voter information improves policy outcomes.
DOI	10.1177/0951629820926699
ISSN	0951-6298/1460-3667
PermalinkURL	http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0951629820926699
researchmap用URL	http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full-xml/10.1177/0951629820926699