モリモト　ケイイチ   MORIMOTO KEIICHI   盛本　圭一    所属   明治大学  政治経済学部    職種   専任准教授
言語種別	英語
発行・発表の年月	2021/05
形態種別	学術雑誌
査読	査読あり
標題	Information use and the Condorcet jury theorem
執筆形態	単著
掲載誌名	Mathematics
掲載区分	国外
出版社・発行元	Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute
巻・号・頁	9(10) 1098
著者・共著者	Keiichi Morimoto
概要	Using a simple model of a coordination game, this paper explores how the information use of individuals affects an optimal committee size. Although enlarging the committee promotes information aggregation, it also stimulates the members’ coordination motive and distorts their voting behavior through higher-order beliefs. On the determination of a finite optimal committee size, the direction and degree of strategic interactions matter. When the strategic complementarity among members is strong, a finite optimal committee size exists. In contrast, it does not exist under strategic substitution. This mechanism is applied to the design of monetary policy committees in a New Keynesian model in which a committee conducts monetary policy under imperfect information.
DOI	10.3390/math9101098