イノウエ　トモキ   INOUE Tomoki   井上　朋紀    所属   明治大学  政治経済学部    職種   専任講師
言語種別	英語
発行・発表の年月	2020/02
形態種別	学術雑誌
査読	査読あり
標題	The nonemptiness of the inner core
執筆形態	単著
掲載誌名	Advances in Mathematical Economics
出版社・発行元	Springer
巻・号・頁	23,pp.85-107
総ページ数	23
概要	We prove that if a non-transferable utility (NTU) game is cardinally balanced and if, at every individually rational and efficient payoff vector, every non-zero normal vector to the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is strictly positive, then the inner core is nonempty. The condition on normal vectors is satisfied if the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is non-leveled. An NTU game generated by an exchange economy where every consumer has a continuous, concave, and strongly monotone utility function satisfies our sufficient condition. Our proof relies on Qin's theorem on the nonemptiness of the inner core.
DOI	10.1007/978-981-15-0713-7_3