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KATO GENTO
Department Undergraduate School , School of Political Science and Economics Position Senior Assistant Professor |
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| Language | English |
| Publication Date | 2020/07 |
| Type | Academic Journal |
| Peer Review | Peer reviewed |
| Title | "When Strategic Uninformed Abstention Improves Democratic Accountability" |
| Contribution Type | Sole-authored |
| Journal | Journal of Theoretical Politics |
| Journal Type | Another Country |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications |
| Volume, Issue, Page | 32(3),pp.366-388 |
| Authorship | Lead author,Corresponding author |
| Author and coauthor | ◎Gento Kato |
| Details | ... formal studies of elections produced two sets of findings that question the custom to treat voter information as a prerequisite for competent democratic decision-making. One argues that uninformed abstention is an effective strategy to approximate informed electoral outcome, and another suggests that uninformed voters may motivate strategic political elites to improve accountability. This article bridges and extends these two findings ... The proposed model offers a contextual explanation for two contrasting logic in uninformed abstention, delegation and discouragement, and shows that uninformed voting with abstention sometimes improves accountability. Furthermore, uninformed abstention is more effective in generating democratically preferred outcome under delegatory than discouraged context. The results make a significant addition to the existing accountability literature by providing a more general mechanism by which less voter information improves policy outcomes. |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629820926699 |
| ISSN | 0951-6298/1460-3667 |
| PermalinkURL | http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0951629820926699 |
| URL for researchmap | http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full-xml/10.1177/0951629820926699 |