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MORIMOTO KEIICHI
Department Undergraduate School , School of Political Science and Economics Position Associate Professor |
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| Language | English |
| Publication Date | 2018/03 |
| Type | Academic Journal |
| Peer Review | Peer reviewed |
| Title | Further results on preference uncertainty and monetary conservatism |
| Contribution Type | Sole-authored |
| Journal | Economics Bulletin |
| Journal Type | Another Country |
| Publisher | AccessEcon |
| Volume, Issue, Page | 38(1),pp.583-592 |
| Details | This study re-examines the optimal delegation problem of monetary policy under preference uncertainty of the central banker. Liberal central bankers are desirable when uncertainty is strong, which is emphasized when the slope of the Phillips curve is flatter, as some empirical works report. However, appointing conservative central bankers is optimal with standard parameter values when monetary policies are conducted by committees, as in most actual economies. |