MORIMOTO KEIICHI
   Department   Undergraduate School  , School of Political Science and Economics
   Position   Associate Professor
Language English
Publication Date 2009/12
Type Other
Title Optimal structure of monetary policy committees
Contribution Type Sole-authored
Journal GCOE Discussion Paper Series
Journal TypeJapan
Publisher Osaka University
Volume, Issue, Page 106
Author and coauthor Keiichi Morimoto
Details This paper explores an optimal personnel organization problem of monetary policy committees. First, I construct an analytically tractable model for monetary policy analysis which starts from decision-making in the monetary policy committee. Using the model, I investigate the relationship between preference heterogeneity among the committee members and the optimal structure of the monetary policy committee. The result shows that it is optimal in general cases to appoint not only inflation-minded (hawkish) persons but also output-minded (dovish) persons. This is a theoretical justification for the fact that the actual monetary policy committees (e.g., MPC of Bank of England and FOMC) usually consist of both type members as the empirical researches suggest. It also explains why the committees have replaced the single policy makers in the actual central banks.