MORIMOTO KEIICHI
   Department   Undergraduate School  , School of Political Science and Economics
   Position   Associate Professor
Language English
Publication Date 2011/04
Type Academic Journal
Peer Review Peer reviewed
Title Inflation inertia and optimal delegation of monetary policy
Contribution Type Sole-authored
Journal Economics Bulletin
Journal TypeAnother Country
Publisher AccessEcon
Volume, Issue, Page 31(2),pp.1114-1124
Author and coauthor Keiichi Morimoto
Details This paper analyzes the relationship between the optimal weight on output gap in the central bank's loss function and the degree of inertia in a hybrid version of New Keynesian model with a pure discretionary inflation targeting. I show that under endogenous persistence of inflation dynamics, even in discretionary monetary policy regime, a Rogoff's (1985) conservative central banker does not necessarily improve social welfare.