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EBINA TAKESHI
Department Undergraduate School , School of Commerce Position Professor |
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| Language | English |
| Publication Date | 2012/06 |
| Type | Academic Journal |
| Peer Review | Peer reviewed |
| Title | "How to License a Public Licensor's Technology to an Asymmetric Duopoly", Economics and Business Letters |
| Contribution Type | Co-authored (first author) |
| Journal | Economics and Business Letters |
| Journal Type | Another Country |
| Publisher | REUNDO |
| Volume, Issue, Page | 1(2),pp.16-26 |
| Author and coauthor | Takeshi Ebina and Shin Kishimoto |
| Details | We consider the issue of optimal licensing from the viewpoint of an external public licensor maximizing social welfare. Our principal findings are as follows. Fee licensing is always at least as good as royalty licensing for the public licensor. For small innovations, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which the public licensor licenses his patented technology to only an efficient (low-cost) firm maximizing its profit. |
| URL for researchmap | https://researchmap.jp/ebinatakeshi2010/ |