Department   Undergraduate School  , School of Commerce
   Position   Professor
Language English
Publication Date 2012/06
Type Academic Journal
Peer Review Peer reviewed
Title "How to License a Public Licensor's Technology to an Asymmetric Duopoly", Economics and Business Letters
Contribution Type Co-authored (first author)
Journal Economics and Business Letters
Journal TypeAnother Country
Publisher REUNDO
Volume, Issue, Page 1(2),pp.16-26
Author and coauthor Takeshi Ebina and Shin Kishimoto
Details We consider the issue of optimal licensing from the viewpoint of an external public licensor maximizing social welfare. Our principal findings are as follows. Fee licensing is always at least as good as royalty licensing for the public licensor. For small innovations, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which the public licensor licenses his patented technology to only an efficient (low-cost) firm maximizing its profit.
URL for researchmap https://researchmap.jp/ebinatakeshi2010/