EBINA TAKESHI
   Department   Undergraduate School  , School of Commerce
   Position   Professor
Language English
Publication Date 2012/06
Type 学術雑誌
査読 査読あり
標題 "How to License a Public Licensor's Technology to an Asymmetric Duopoly", Economics and Business Letters
執筆形態 共著(筆頭者)
掲載誌名 Economics and Business Letters
掲載区分国外
出版社・発行元 REUNDO
巻・号・頁 1(2),pp.16-26
著者・共著者 Takeshi Ebina and Shin Kishimoto
概要 We consider the issue of optimal licensing from the viewpoint of an external public licensor maximizing social welfare. Our principal findings are as follows. Fee licensing is always at least as good as royalty licensing for the public licensor. For small innovations, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which the public licensor licenses his patented technology to only an efficient (low-cost) firm maximizing its profit.
researchmap用URL https://researchmap.jp/ebinatakeshi2010/