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EBINA TAKESHI
Department Undergraduate School , School of Commerce Position Professor |
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| Language | English |
| Publication Date | 2010/08 |
| Type | International Conference |
| Peer Review | Peer reviewed |
| Title | "A Public Patentee's Technology Transfer under a Leadership Structure", Lecture Notes in Operations Research |
| Contribution Type | Co-authored (first author) |
| Journal | Lecture Notes in Operations Research |
| Journal Type | Another Country |
| Publisher | World Publishing |
| Volume, Issue, Page | 12,pp.195-203 |
| Author and coauthor | Takeshi Ebina and Shin Kishimoto |
| Details | In this paper, we consider the issue of optimal licensing from the viewpoint of a public patent holder having no production facilities when the product market has a Stackelberg leadership structure. We show that fee licensing is always at least as good as royalty licensing for the public patentee maximizing the social welfare. It is also shown that for small innovations, there exists an equilibrium in which the public patentee licenses his patented technology to only the efficient, profit-maximizing private firm but he never licenses his technology to only the inefficient private
firm. |
| URL for researchmap | https://researchmap.jp/ebinatakeshi2010/ |