Department   Undergraduate School  , School of Commerce
   Position   Professor
Language English
Publication Date 2010/08
Type International Conference
Peer Review Peer reviewed
Title "A Public Patentee's Technology Transfer under a Leadership Structure", Lecture Notes in Operations Research
Contribution Type Co-authored (first author)
Journal Lecture Notes in Operations Research
Journal TypeAnother Country
Publisher World Publishing
Volume, Issue, Page 12,pp.195-203
Author and coauthor Takeshi Ebina and Shin Kishimoto
Details In this paper, we consider the issue of optimal licensing from the viewpoint of a public patent holder having no production facilities when the product market has a Stackelberg leadership structure. We show that fee licensing is always at least as good as royalty licensing for the public patentee maximizing the social welfare. It is also shown that for small innovations, there exists an equilibrium in which the public patentee licenses his patented technology to only the efficient, profit-maximizing private firm but he never licenses his technology to only the inefficient private
URL for researchmap https://researchmap.jp/ebinatakeshi2010/