INOUE Tomoki
   Department   Undergraduate School  , School of Political Science and Economics
   Position   Senior Assistant Professor
Language English
Publication Date 2013/03
Type Academic Journal
Peer Review Peer reviewed
Title Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies
Contribution Type Sole-authored
Journal Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume, Issue, Page 49(2),pp.141-149
Details We prove that every compactly generated non-transferable utility (NTU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. The set of Walrasian payoff vectors for our induced coalition production economy coincides with the inner core of the balanced cover of the original game. This equivalence depends heavily on our representation. We exemplify that this equivalence need not hold in other representations. We also give a sufficient condition for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for our induced coalition production economy.
DOI 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.12.001