INOUE Tomoki
Department Undergraduate School , School of Political Science and Economics Position Senior Assistant Professor |
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Language | English |
Publication Date | 2020/02 |
Type | Academic Journal |
Peer Review | Peer reviewed |
Title | The nonemptiness of the inner core |
Contribution Type | Sole-authored |
Journal | Advances in Mathematical Economics |
Publisher | Springer |
Volume, Issue, Page | 23,pp.85-107 |
Total page number | 23 |
Details | We prove that if a non-transferable utility (NTU) game is cardinally balanced and if, at every individually rational and efficient payoff vector, every non-zero normal vector to the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is strictly positive, then the inner core is nonempty. The condition on normal vectors is satisfied if the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is non-leveled. An NTU game generated by an exchange economy where every consumer has a continuous, concave, and strongly monotone utility function satisfies our sufficient condition. Our proof relies on Qin's theorem on the nonemptiness of the inner core. |
DOI | 10.1007/978-981-15-0713-7_3 |