シミズ　カズユキ   SHIMIZU Kazuyuki   清水　一之    所属   明治大学  経営学部    職種   専任教授
言語種別	英語
発行・発表の年月	2019/03
形態種別	国際会議議事録
標題	“Pricing Game” for tacit collusion and Passive Investment
執筆形態	単著
掲載誌名	the Collaborative European Research Conference (CERC 2019)
掲載区分	国外
出版社・発行元	CERC 2019
巻・号・頁	pp.323-334
総ページ数	11
概要	This paper aimed to figure out the structural factors of tacit collusion from the perspective of the oligopolistic market. A two-step approach is adopted to analyse this phenomenon. As pricing mechanisms shift from traditional method to computational algorithm, herein termed the “pricing game”, new forms of collusion are expected to emerge. First, game theory is applied toward an understanding of this unspoken collusion. Second, firms are owned by overlapping sets of passive investors, and their incentives to compete are thereby reduced. A potential solution for this situation may be found in family ownership, as a countervailing power for healthy competition.
researchmap用URL	http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2348/paper23.pdf