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SHIMIZU Kazuyuki
Department Undergraduate School , School of Business Administration Position Professor |
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| Language | English |
| Publication Date | 2019/03 |
| Type | International conference proceedings |
| Title | “Pricing Game” for tacit collusion and Passive Investment |
| Contribution Type | Sole-authored |
| Journal | the Collaborative European Research Conference (CERC 2019) |
| Journal Type | Another Country |
| Publisher | CERC 2019 |
| Volume, Issue, Page | pp.323-334 |
| Total page number | 11 |
| Details | This paper aimed to figure out the structural factors of tacit collusion from the perspective of the oligopolistic market. A two-step approach is adopted to analyse this phenomenon. As pricing mechanisms shift from traditional method to computational algorithm, herein termed the “pricing game”, new forms of collusion are expected to emerge. First, game theory is applied toward an understanding of this unspoken collusion. Second, firms are owned by overlapping sets of passive investors, and their incentives to compete are thereby reduced. A potential solution for this situation may be found in family ownership, as a countervailing power for healthy competition. |
| URL for researchmap | http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2348/paper23.pdf |